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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
SMALL WOOD V STATE: A WRIT OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE
IS NOT AVAILABLE TO CONVICTED DEFENDANTS WHO
ARE GUILTY OF THEIR CRIME, EVEN IF THEY ARE
DEEMED NOT CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE.
By: Andrew Siske
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that convicted defendants must
allege that they did not actually commit the crime resulting in their
conviction to be eligible to petition for a writ of actual innocence under
section 8-301 of Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code.
Smallwood v. State, 451 Md. 290, 323, 152 A.3d 776, 795 (2017).

Additionally, the court ruled that a claim of not criminally responsible is not
equivalent to an assertion of actual innocence as required by the court's
interpretation of the actual innocence statute. Id.
Dameron Smallwood ("Smallwood") was physically and verbally abused
by his mother throughout his youth. In mid-October 1984, Smallwood was
suspended from school for talking back to a teacher. Enraged, Smallwood's
mother locked him in the house for several days. On October 22, 1984,
Smallwood's mother finally let him leave the house, at which point he went
to visit an apartment complex where they had previously lived. He knocked
on the door of Madge K. Gibson ("Gibson"), a stranger to Smallwood, and
claimed to be delivering a package that required Gibson's signature. When
Gibson opened the door, Smallwood stabbed her ten times, subsequently
causing her death.
Smallwood was indicted as an adult for first-degree murder and related
offenses. He petitioned for a reverse waiver hearing to move his case to
juvenile court. During the reverse waiver hearing in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County, Dr. Ellen McDaniel ("McDaniel") and other psychiatrists
testified regarding Smallwood's mental health. McDaniel testified that
Smallwood often coped with his abuse by fantasizing about Jack the Ripper
and killing women. Nevertheless, McDaniel and another expert witness
opined that Smallwood was not "legally insane" at the time he attacked
Gibson. Neither party otherwise discussed or contested Smallwood's
criminal responsibility. The circuit court denied Smallwood's request for a
reverse waiver. On March 13, 1985, Smallwood entered a plea of not guilty
on an agreed statement of facts and was convicted of first-degree murder and
other related offenses. Smallwood received a life sentence.
In 2009, Smallwood's new attorney urged McDaniel to reconsider her
1985 opinion that Smallwood was not "legally insane" at the time of the
crime.
In 2011, McDaniel concluded that her 1985 assessment of
Smallwood was flawed and that Smallwood was not criminally responsible
("NCR") when he committed the offense. McDaniel attributed her revised
opinion to scientific advancements in understanding how trauma impacts
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brain development, changes to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, and McDaniel's increased professional experience.
On August 29, 2011, Smallwood filed a Petition for a Writ of Actual
Innocence under section 8-301 of the Criminal Procedure Article ("section 8301"). As required by the statute, Smallwood characterized McDaniel's
revised opinion as "newly discovered evidence" which created a substantial
likelihood that Smallwood's initial prosecution may have resulted
differently. On November 2, 2012, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
conducted an evidentiary hearing on Smallwood's petition and considered
both McDaniel's revised opinion and opposing testimony from the State's
psychiatric expert.
On February 12, 2013, the circuit court denied Smallwood's petition. The
court concluded that Smallwood was ineligible for relief under the theory of
actual innocence because he alleged that he was NCR at the time the offense
was committed, not that he was actually innocent. The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the circuit court's denial, holding that an
individual must explicitly deny committing the crime in question to be
eligible to petition for a writ of actual innocence pursuant to section 8-301.
The court of appeals granted Smallwood's petition for a writ ofcertiorari.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began by analyzing whether section 8301 applies to a convicted defendant who later presents "newly discovered
evidence" suggesting that he was NCR at the time of the offense.
Smallwood, 451 Md. at 309, 152 A.3d at 787. First, the court considered the
plain meaning of the statute, noting that the title of a statute is relevant to
determining its intent and purpose. Id. at 312, 152 A.3d at 788 (citing Mayor
& Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enters., 372 Md. 514, 555, 815 A.2d 469,
493 (2002)). While section 8-301 is entitled "Petition for writ of actual
innocence," the phrase "actual innocence" is not defined or clarified within
the statute. Smallwood, 451 Md. at 312, 152 A.3d at 788. Accordingly, the
court turned to the dictionary definitions of "actual" and "innocence,"
concluding that "actual innocence" means "the defendant did not commit the
crime or offense for which he or she was convicted." Id. at 313, 152 A.3d at
789.
Next, the court considered the statutory scheme surrounding section 8-301
to discern the purpose of the statute. Smallwood, 451 Md. at 313, 152 A.3d
at 789. Prior to 2001, only criminal defendants alleging a constitutional
violation or presenting "newly discovered evidence" within one-year of
either the sentence's imposition or the last mandated appeal could petition
for post-conviction relief. Id. at 313-14, 152 A.3d at 789-90 (citing MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-102; Md. R. 4-331). In 2001, the General
Assembly enacted section 8-201 of the Criminal Procedure Article ("section
8-201"), permitting individuals convicted of violent crimes to petition for
DNA testing of scientific evidence possessed by the state related to the
individual's conviction. Smallwood, 451 Md. at 315, 152 A.3d at 790.
Previous court of appeals' decisions found that section 8-201 was enacted to
provide relief to convicted persons who were "actually innocent," meaning

2017]1

Smallwood v. State

169

that they did not in fact commit the crime underlying their conviction. Id. at
316, 152 A.3d at 790-91 (citing Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 715, 97 A.2d
999, 1009 (2009) (citations omitted)).
The court then turned to testimony in support of section 8-301 to further
elucidate its purpose. Smallwood, 451 Md. at 316-17, 152 A.3d at 791.
Lawmakers testified about the need to fill the statutory gap for convicted
persons unable to obtain post-conviction relief because their newly
discovered evidence was either non-biological or discovered after the oneyear limitation in Maryland Rule 4-331. Id. (citations omitted). Further,
testimony emphasized how section 8-301 would enable convicted defendants
to assert their innocence, and that the statute would only apply to a narrow
group of convicted individuals. Smallwood, 451 Md. at 318, 319, 152 A.3d
at 792, 793 (citations omitted).
Next, the court clarified the relationship between section 8-301 and
Maryland Rule 4-332 ("Rule 4-332"), even though Smallwood filed his
petition before the rule took effect. Smallwood, 451 Md. at 320, 152 A.3d
793. Rule 4-332 requires defendants to assert, in their actual innocence
petition, that they did not commit the crime resulting in their conviction. Id.
Smallwood argued that the court of appeals can only enact rules, which
concern practice and procedure, and that Rule 4-332 improperly abridges the
substance of section 8-301. Id. at 320-21, 152 A.3d 793-94. The court,
however, held that based on its own analysis, section 8-301 already demands
what Rule 4-332 requires. Id. Further, the court noted that prior to Rule 4332, precedent addressed the need for procedural direction regarding how
section 8-301 should be implemented. Id. (citing State v. Matthews, 415 Md.
286, 297-98, 999 A.2d 1050, 1057 (2010)). Consequently, the court ruled
that Rule 4-332 properly guides the application of section 8-301.
Smallwood, 451 Md. at 321, 152 A.3d at 794.
Finally, the court considered whether a determination of NCR precludes a
finding of guilt. Smallwood, 451 Md. at 321-22, 152 A.3d at 794-95.
Previous decisions have held that a finding of NCR is separate from a finding
of guilt or innocence, and that a criminal defendant could be found both
guilty and NCR. Id. at 322, 152 A.3d at 794 (citing Langworthy v. State, 284
Md. 588, 594, 399 A.2 579, 581-82 (1979)). The court concluded that a
claim of NCR is not the same as a claim of being "actually innocent."
Smallwood, 451 Md. at 322, 152 A.3d at 794-95. Thus, Smallwood was
ineligible to seek relief under section 8-301. Id. at 322-23, 152 A.3d at 79495.
In Smallwood, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the actual
innocence statute provides relief only to criminal defendants who can allege
that they did not commit the crime underlying their conviction. This holding
conclusively defines "actual innocence" under section 8-301 and illuminates
the connection between the statute and Rule 4-332. Accordingly, Smallwood
clarifies what criminal defense attorneys must include in actual innocence
petitions. In doing so, Smallwood narrows the population of defendants
eligible for relief under the actual innocence statute. However, it leaves open
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another statutory gap that may limit mentally ill defendants who obtain
"newly discovered evidence" suggesting that they should have been
institutionalized rather than incarcerated.
Unless convicted defendants
erroneously deemed criminally responsible can successfully challenge
Smallwood's interpretation of section 8-301, their only hope lies in the
General Assembly.

